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Abstract 
 
Within the field of information security, the 
identification of what we are trying to secure is essential 
to reducing risk. In private networks, this means 
understanding the classification of host end-points, 
identifying responsible users, and knowing the location 
of hosts. For the context of this paper, the authors are 
considering the challenges faced by higher education 
institutions in implementing the first Center for Internet 
Security (CIS) Critical Security Control: inventory of 
authorized and unauthorized devices. The authors 
developed and conducted a survey of chief information 
security officers at these institutions. The survey 
evaluated their confidence in meeting the goals of host 
inventory tracking. The results of the survey, along with 
analysis of the implications for information security 
operations, are presented in this paper. Changes in 
technology, such as BYOD, IoT, wireless, virtual 
machines, and application containers, are contributing 
to changes in the effectiveness of host inventory 
controls.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
At the beginning of a normal workday, an analyst is 
monitoring for incidents in a security operations center. 
The analyst is enjoying a slow start so they are catching 
up on emails from the previous day. Unfortunately, it 
does not take long before they see an alert from one of 
the institution’s intrusion detection systems. The analyst 
is concerned because this alert is for a particularly 
nefarious type of malware associated with theft of 
personally identifiable information. As the analyst 
creates a ticket to begin the response process, another 
alert comes up. This time for a host identified with a 
ransomware download. The analyst recognizes the IP 
address as being in one of the administrative areas of the 
institution. The analyst knows that if the ransomware 
executes, it will begin encrypting the user’s local files 
and any folders on a file server. Even if backups of the 
data are available, either incident could lead to data 
exfiltration. Now the analyst must work fast to notify 
responsible individuals quickly. If the tools available to 
the analyst cannot provide an answer to who they should 
contact, or the tools provide the incorrect person, more 
time will be spent finding the responsible user while the 
malware is in control and potentially doing harm.  
In incident response, the time between initial 
identification and containment is critical to reducing 
damage particularly when sensitive or high-risk data is 
involved [1]. This is particularly true with modern 
malware moving to mobile devices and evolving to 
include theft of messages, position data, and banking 
credentials, all with real-time attacker command and 
control [2]. 
 
2. CIS Critical Security Control one 
 
Organizations must prioritize the application of 
resources in the defense of cyber-attacks to minimize 
risk to their networks. Cyber security controls 
frameworks help with this prioritization, and often 
recommend specific methods, software, and systems to 
implement individual controls. Johnson states “all 
security and corporate managers now need to be 
concerned with compliance and governance of risks, 
security, and the information usage in their systems” [3]. 
This is especially true for higher education institutions 
that conduct research and must comply with mandates 
to defend against cyber-attacks or risk losing funding.  
CIS is a not-for-profit organization “dedicated to 
enhancing the cyber security readiness and response 
among public and private sector entities” [4]. The CIS 
Critical Security Controls (CSC) for Effective Cyber 
Defense exist as a framework to help organizations 
improve their information security strategy. The 
Controls were developed by experts from many 
different organizations who “pooled their extensive 
first-hand knowledge from defending against actual 
cyber-attacks to evolve the consensus list of Controls, 
representing the best defensive techniques to prevent or 
track them” [5]. The twenty Controls are “a prioritized, 
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highly focused set of actions that have a community 
support network to make them implementable, usable, 
scalable, and compliant with all industry or government 
security requirements” [5]. The CSC framework is 
intended to provide an organization with key areas 
where they should specifically focus their efforts. Each 
Control gives example technologies that an organization 
can implement to help achieve their goal of reducing 
risk. As no single measure is guaranteed to prevent 
cyber security incidents, organizations are encouraged 
to implement all the Controls to have a defense in depth 
strategy.  
In this paper we focus on the first Control outlined 
in the CSC: inventory of authorized and unauthorized 
devices. As of version 6.1 of the CSC, six sub controls 
are defined for the first Control.  
CSC 1.1, “deploy an automated asset inventory 
discovery tool…” [5] is common for Internet Protocol 
version 4 (IPv4) networks. Organizations can scan their 
network address space to identify hosts, and even 
attempt operating system identification.  Nmap and 
other tools can provide this ability [6]. Unfortunately, 
scanning an Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) network 
is not so straightforward, due to the extremely large 
address space and time it would take to iterate through 
each to send probe packets to solicit a response [7]. In 
more recent years, passive scanning, or the listening for 
active hosts on the network, has become more common. 
This involves “the process of monitoring network traffic 
at the packet layer to determine topology, services, and 
vulnerabilities” [8].  
CSC 1.2, “deploy dynamic host configuration 
protocol (DHCP) server logging...” [5] is something that 
most organizations can easily implement. By simply 
logging DHCP server events, we can better track hosts 
on the network. This is commonly used in IPv4 
networks; however, depending on the IPv6 deployment, 
DHCP may or may not be used. IPv6 networks may use 
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), 
DHCPv6, or statically assigned addresses [9], [10]. 
CSC 1.3, “ensure that all equipment acquisitions 
automatically update the inventory...” [5] is 
fundamentally a business process. To comply, 
organizations must make sure there are automatic 
updates to the inventory based on new acquisitions. This 
can be accomplished by integrating an Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) application with the inventory 
system. Doing these updates manually becomes 
problematic for many organizations, requiring data 
entry in the business and financial applications that is 
IT-specific. In some organizations there is a 
fundamental decoupling of business operations from 
network operations. 
CSC 1.4, “maintain an asset inventory of all systems 
connected to the network…” [5] describes an all-
encompassing inventory. This Control seems to be 
solved by using a database-driven application to track 
this information. This is common, as are spreadsheets, 
in many organizations. However, the accuracy of these 
manual processes usually erodes over time, given the 
significant effort required by personnel to enter and 
update each host’s details. This technique also does not 
scale for networks with tens or hundreds of thousands of 
hosts. Something that is common to research institution 
networks is the ability to Bring Your Own Device 
(BYOD) and connect it to the network. While many 
corporate networks are able to resist BYOD, higher 
education has seen this for decades. This means that 
CSC 1.3 is not applicable in this situation since the 
owner of the device is not the same as the owner of the 
network.  
CSC 1.5, “deploy network level authentication via 
802.1x…” [5] requires every host to be authenticated to 
the network. This is commonly deployed for wireless 
and some wired networks. Sometimes it is also deployed 
to authenticate Voice over IP (VoIP) devices to separate 
Virtual Local Area Networks (VLAN). Depending on 
the end points, this may be less feasible to deploy across 
the entire network of an organization. There may also be 
limitations on the deployment of 802.1x with older 
networking equipment. 
Finally, CSC 1.6, “use client certificates…” [5] 
requires the use of certificates to authenticate each 
device instead of a username and password. Client 
certificates are a highly secure method of authentication 
but do carry significant management overhead. 
 
3. Survey design  
 
Our higher education CISO survey was designed to 
answer the following high-level questions: Are new 
technologies changing the accuracy of inventory 
controls? How quickly can the location of a host and the 
responsible user be identified? Are current host 
inventory controls effective? Have there been changes 
in effectiveness due to increases in Internet of Things 
(IoT) and BYOD hosts? Do the responses vary with 
subsets of the population such as size of the network or 
number of employees dedicated to information security 
operations? 
The survey was also intended to look for correlations 
between sizes or types of institutions and network 
architectures. Network architectures will vary with the 
type of institution to include the amount of research, 
number of residential students, and user population size. 
Some of the questions were based on similar surveys 
that identified current challenges in information security 
for higher education institutions [11]. 
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The survey was reviewed by several information 
technology professionals for the quality of questions and 
answers. Many questions were modified or removed to 
reduce ambiguity and improve readability. The survey 
was tested prior to release and the respondents’ test 
results were also used to improve the questions.  
No personal information of the respondents was 
solicited. The only identifying attribute recorded was 
the respondent’s IP address. This was used to identify 
whether multiple responses were recorded for the same 
institution. This also gave the ability to delete a response 
at the request of a respondent by asking them to verify 
the IP address they used. Even with this single piece of 
information that could be linked to the institution, it will 
be removed once the survey is closed. This is to 
encourage honest responses without fear of the 
respondent being identified.  
The target population for the survey is all higher 
education institutions in the United States. According to 
the Carnegie Classification, there are approximately 
4,600 institutions [12]. The first question of the survey 
was to identify the respondent’s institution’s Basic 
Carnegie Classification. Additionally, questions were 
asked to determine the size and attributes of each 
institution to include numbers of students, employees, 
employees in information security roles, and estimated 
research expenditures. This first section of the survey 
was used to provide a framework for comparison of like 
institutions only. The second, third, and fourth sections 
of the survey asked questions pertinent to network size, 
host identification, and evaluation of controls. Samples 
of those survey questions are mapped to the appropriate 
CSC control in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Select questions mapped to the CSC 
Survey Question CSC 
2.1. What is your best estimate for the peak 
number of hosts on your network at one time? 
1.2, 
1.4, 
1.5 
2.2. What is the average number of BYOD 
hosts each type of end-user connects to your 
network? 
1.3, 
1.4 
2.4. What is your best estimate for the number 
of sub-networks (Local Area Network 
segments or broadcast domains)? 
1.1, 
1.4 
2.10. Where does your institution allow 
embedded hosts or Internet of Things (IoT) on 
your network? 
1.3, 
1.4 
3.1. What is the estimated percentage of each 
type of host on your network? 
1.3, 
1.4 
3.3. What IP addressing methods do you use? 1.1, 
1.4 
3.7. How confident are you in your 
organization’s ability to identify hosts with 
multiple, changing addresses, to include 
application containers (Docker) and IPv6 
privacy extensions (RFC 4941)? 
1.1, 
1.4 
3.8. What percentage of hosts on your network 
utilize some form of network authentication to 
connect (IEEE 802.1x, NAC, etc.)? 
1.5, 
1.6 
4.1. For the purposes of your host inventory 
controls, what types of hosts do you track? 
1.3, 
1.4 
4.2. During a potential security incident or 
event, how long does it usually take to track 
down the responsible user or owner of these 
host types? 
1.4, 
1.5 
4.6. How accurate have you found the 
following tools and technologies to be in 
keeping track of hosts in your network? 
1.4, 
1.5 
4.7. Do you consider embedded devices or IoT 
hosts more difficult to track than other hosts? 
1.4 
 
The survey had 42 questions but some asked the 
respondent to answer for different cases which results in 
up to 96 total data points. Only one question had a 
required response due to validation needed to constrain 
the sum of the response to one hundred percent.  
 
4. Results  
 
The survey was opened for distribution to 
participants on May 24, 2017. Since the survey was 
targeting Chief Information Security Officers of higher 
education, several email lists were used to distribute the 
anonymous link. Most respondents completed the 
survey in less than 20 minutes.  
 
4.1. Institution classification 
 
These survey results cover 51 responses. More than 
half of the respondents reported their institutions to be 
R1, R2, or R3 doctoral granting universities with 
research activity as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Percentage of respondent 
institutions by Basic Carnegie Classification 
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40%
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18%
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Using the high-end of the selected ranges for total 
employees, employees in IT, and employees in security 
operations, ratios were calculated. The results showed 
the ratios of employees to be 5.3 percent for IT to total 
employees and 5.4 percent for information security to IT 
employees. 
There was a wide variety of reported enrolled 
students with most reporting between 2,000 and 50,000. 
There was some variance with the number of reported 
remote students. However, more than half of the 
respondents reported 10 percent or fewer remote 
students. 
 
4.2. Network characteristics 
 
For question 2.1, most of the respondents selected 
the peak hosts on their network to be 10,000 to 50,000. 
Eleven respondents said their networks were greater 
than 50,000.  One stated they had more than 500,000 
peak hosts on their network. 
One important question asked, “How is the 
respondent’s network managed?” The results are shown 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: CISO's ability to deny or allow hosts 
 
This question may have been interpreted differently 
than anticipated. The intent was to determine how 
federated or completely centralized the institution’s IT 
functions were. If the respondents understood the 
question, it is possible that their institutions are mostly 
centralized in terms of managing the network. 
Figure 2 shows the responses to question 2.2, BYOD 
host percentages by user type. The differences are 
particularly pronounced for residential students in the 4 
to 6 range. 
 
 
Figure 2: BYOD host quantity by user type 
For the average number of BYOD hosts connected 
by non-residential students, 67 percent of respondents 
said 2 to 3. This differs from the number of BYOD hosts 
connected by residential students, which was split 
between 2 to 3 and 4 to 6. This is not surprising, as you 
can assume that residential students will connect devices 
in their dorm rooms that they would otherwise keep in 
an off-campus residence. What we found surprising is 
that 73 percent of respondents said employees 
connected 2 to 3 BYOD hosts. This means that most 
institutions expect employees to connect 2 to 3 personal, 
BYOD devices that are not institutionally owned. 
Questions 2.9 and 2.10 in the survey asked where the 
institution allowed BYOD and embedded or IoT hosts. 
The results in Figure 3 show that most respondents 
chose “most logical network zones” for BYOD hosts.  
 
Figure 3: Where BYOD, embedded, and IoT 
hosts are allowed 
For embedded or IoT hosts, the response was evenly 
distributed. The exception to both is that a few 
institutions allow BYOD and embedded or IoT hosts on 
all network zones. 
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4.3. Defining a host 
 
The authors were interested in understanding what 
the average distribution of host types are on an 
institution’s network. Question 3.1 asked respondents to 
provide their estimated percentage of each of four host 
categories: embedded devices, servers, institutionally 
owned end-user devices, and BYOD end-user devices. 
The results in Table 3 show that, on average, embedded 
devices (IoT, printers, cameras) and BYOD end-user 
devices make up half of an institutions network.  
 
Table 3: Host type percentages 
 
When asked about the percentage of hosts that use 
statically assigned IP addresses, all but one respondent 
said 10 or 20 percent. In addition, the respondents were 
asked what addressing methods they used. The results 
are shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Types of addressing used on wired 
and wireless connections 
Interestingly, eight respondents stated that they used 
static IPv4 addressing on wireless connections. These 
could be embedded devices such as printers or copies 
using wireless however, the authors would expect 
DHCP Reservations to be used for wireless devices 
Questions 3.6 and 3.7 asked how confident the 
respondent was in identifying unique individual hosts 
for virtual machines and application containers. The 
results are shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Confidence in identifying virtual 
machines and application containers 
The last question of this section asked how 
respondents identified a unique host. Most all stated, in 
their own words, that a MAC address was the unique 
identifier.  
 
4.4. Evaluation of inventory controls 
 
In this section of the survey, the first question asked 
respondents to identify whether or not a particular host 
type was tracked. The results are shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Host tracking by type 
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It is worth noting that fewer respondents said BYOD, 
embedded or IoT, and application containers were 
tracked. Most respondents tracked physical and virtual 
servers, VoIP phones, video cameras, printers, and 
institutionally owned network equipment. 
Figure 7 shows the time it takes to track down the 
physical location of a host for non-research institutions. 
It is worth noting that a greater number of research 
institutions (R1, R2, and R3) selected the more than 60 
minutes option for multiple host types as shown in 
Figure 8. This could be due to the larger number of hosts 
on research institution networks or the distribution of IT 
responsibility. 
 
Figure 7: Time to find physical location of 
different host types for non-research 
institutions 
For question 4.4, respondents were asked how often 
their inventory controls and tools lead to someone who 
is not the current responsible user and most respondents 
selected a few times a month. Some wrote in that it 
varies widely and that it is worse for lab environments. 
Question 4.6 asked respondents how accurate they 
thought various inventory tools were. The results are 
show in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 8: Time to find physical location of 
different host types for research institutions 
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It is worth noting that five respondents said that 
mapping or scanning of IPv6 was somewhat or very 
accurate.  It would be interesting to know their methods 
given the large address space. 
Questions 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 asked if certain host types 
were more difficult to track than others as shown in 
Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10: Difficulty tracking host types 
The third host type, NAT/PAT, was used to determine 
whether address translation has an impact on  inventory 
controls. Interestingly, seven respondents selected not 
applicable for NAT/PAT. The authors surmise that these 
institutions may have enough IPv4 addresses for all 
hosts, and therefore have no need for address 
translation.  
Questions 4.11 and 4.12 asked if respondents believe 
the effectiveness of their host inventory controls 
changed in the past five years for either BYOD and IoT 
hosts. As shown in Figure 11, nearly half of the 
respondents from research institutions stated that both 
host types impacted the effectiveness of their inventory 
controls. 
 
Figure 11: Effectiveness of host inventory 
controls from impact of IoT and BYOD for 
research institutions 
Question 4.13 asked respondents how much time 
they spend updating host inventory control tools. The 
results, charted in Figure 12, show that more than half 
of institutions spend a moderate to significant amount of 
time updating records. 
 
Figure 12: Time spent updating inventory 
tools 
The final question of the survey asked if the 
respondent had any specific challenges with host 
inventory controls. A couple of respondents stated that 
it is difficult to have a unified inventory with a 
distributed IT responsibility. One respondent also stated 
that NAT/PAT can be an issue for their DMCA 
complaints. Another stated that they would like to raise 
awareness of keeping inventories current and correct.  
 
5. Discussion and insights 
 
It is worth noting that even though the CSC 1 
provides methods for inventory, these are corporate 
enterprise-centric. Even though a higher education 
institution network may be a special case, the way it 
works may actually become more common. With 
BYOD, wireless, and virtualization, the methods of 
traditional inventory are becoming more difficult to 
deploy and scale. Specifically with BYOD, corporate 
networks are allowing more personal devices in their 
environments [13]. Some will segment their wireless 
networks; however, there is ever growing pressure for 
these corporate networks to allow personal devices on 
their more restrictive network segments. 
 
5.1. Network access 
 
We must consider the user-base as we discuss access 
and authenticating to a network. In a higher education 
institution’s network, there is an expectation that access 
to the Internet should be unhindered. This is because 
faculty and students need to complete their work by 
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collaborating with other higher education institutions 
and industry partners. To them, the network is only a 
tool to accomplish this. Additionally, many research 
institutions have multiple campuses along with faculty 
and students who are frequently traveling around the 
world. With this culture, there is usually greater 
emphasis on controlling access at the applications that 
are globally available.  
This leads to the discussion of private versus public 
networks. Many higher education institutions operate 
networks, which could be considered hybrids. For legal 
reasons, most institutions consider themselves private 
networks, but discussions have been ongoing ever since 
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement 
Act (CALEA) and the USA PATRIOT Act have come 
into existence [14]. Even with this designation, most 
faculty and students expect open access to the Internet. 
This is a culture that has been around since the early 
years of the Internet. Larger higher education networks 
are traditionally operated like Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) where their primary focus is to make sure packets 
are getting from one host to another. In recent years, 
some higher education institutions have become more 
limiting on the free flow of traffic in and out of their 
networks. Nonetheless, these networks remain much 
more open than other private networks such as those in 
corporate environments. This cultural tendency makes 
requiring high assurance authentication to the network, 
and ultimately the Internet, a challenge. 
 
5.2. Host attributes 
 
In previous decades, a host might have used the same 
IPv4 address for long periods of time, sometimes 
months or even years. The pace at which IT systems are 
changing is increasing. The life cycle of an individual 
host has shortened while the expectations of service 
availability has increased. This leads to redundancy 
inside a host’s subsystems and to redundancy in entire 
hosts. With redundancy at the host level, the service may 
change which hosts are responding to requests. This 
leads to hosts that are dynamic and taken out of service 
for maintenance or failure. Virtualization furthers this 
trend of more difficulty in tracking hosts. Virtualization 
enables the decoupling hosts from hardware, thereby 
allowing movement. The Media Access Control (MAC) 
addresses, previously considered relatively static, are 
now created when new virtual machines (VM) are 
defined [15]. The ease of creating and moving VMs can 
be a challenge for traditional host inventory tools.  
Some environments are moving to services being 
deployed in containers by which the operating system or 
host is considered separate. This leads to even more 
churn in the traditionally static hosts providing services. 
For example, Docker is a containerization platform that 
provides separation of applications from their operating 
system. Using Linux kernel technology, the containers 
even have their own network interfaces [16]. These 
interfaces, like the virtual machines, have their own 
MAC addresses. Again, this can complicate the issue of 
how we define a host and what attributes we inventory. 
 
5.3. Host responsibility and organizational 
inefficiencies 
 
Answering the question of who is responsible is core 
to host inventory. This can be a difficult problem in a 
federated research institution network. There can be 
hosts in which the user is the responsible party, as is the 
case for BYOD. There are also groups of hosts in which 
an IT professional is responsible. In some instances the 
research institution can have both a central IT 
organization and distributed IT professionals reporting 
through different leadership. This federated network 
management model requires more effort to define and 
track who is responsible for any host. One common 
method involves the assignment of blocks of addresses 
to organizational units. The institution assumes that 
organizational units will track hosts within their 
assigned block. It is an honor system and can be 
problematic if the organizational unit has no knowledge 
of a host using one of its addresses.  
Two of the sub controls from CSC 1 are focused on 
authenticating to the network. If we accept the scenario 
in which all devices on a network are authenticated, we 
still have to map the user to a group or responsible IT 
professional. Again, BYOD comes into play whereby 
the organization may not have a record of who the 
device belongs to or who should be contacted if there is 
an incident involving it. 
One last consideration is the time involved in 
maintaining most host inventories. It is simple to keep 
the inventory of a twenty-host network up to date. The 
time it takes to maintain the inventory increases steadily 
with the number of hosts unless efficient tools are used. 
Even then, there is significant time spent on updating 
each host entry. This can be a burden on already busy IT 
personnel and takes them away from solving more high 
profile issues. IT professionals can also miscategorize 
or mistype information. This fundamentally human 
element makes a tedious tracking process more 
inaccurate as time goes on. 
 
6. Future work 
 
The number of security incidents occurring within 
many networks is increasing. The time to detection is 
not keeping up with the time to compromise as 
described in the Verizon 2016 Data Breach 
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Investigations Report [17]. This means that we must get 
better at reducing time to detection and ultimately 
remediation. By improving a network’s host inventory, 
we can reduce the time to remediation. This is 
accomplished by quickly determining where a host is 
and who is responsible.  
An accurate host inventory is also a place of record 
for answering other questions. These include which 
hosts may need operating system updates and which 
hosts may be vulnerable to newly announced exploits. 
This valuable tool goes beyond information security to 
include understanding how hosts change over time. 
If we can leverage automated data flows to populate 
a host inventory, we can also extend it to become more 
about crowdsourcing IT security. Presenting users with 
options and information pertinent to their hosts, we can 
enable them to make decisions rather than those 
personnel at the organization level. In time sensitive 
incidents, this can reduce risk of data exposure by 
getting the people who know the host the best looking 
at the problem. This also enables organizational IT 
security personnel to focus on wide trends and hunt for 
vulnerabilities. This encourages the philosophy that 
those closest to the hosts know most about them and 
security is local. 
Much of the information needed to create a dynamic, 
host inventory with minimal human intervention is 
already available. The information is in the form of log 
events which are often left on servers or sent to closed 
systems for human review. This information should be 
consolidated and used for more than just ad hoc queries. 
Correlation of user authentication with host activity has 
been implemented in higher education institution 
networks in the form of the Grand Unified Logging 
Program (GULP) [18]. This system, developed at 
Columbia University, demonstrates that it is possible to 
maintain open access to a network and identify 
responsible users without preregistration or network 
authentication. 
The authors have begun designing a solution that 
uses network device generated data, such as MAC 
address to IP address mappings and user authentications 
to applications, as shown in Figure 13. This design 
builds on existing solutions and utilizes near real-time 
data flows. 
Now that data analytics has become more the norm, 
and compute cycles and memory are inexpensive, we 
can use these resources to mine relevant log events for 
the right information [19]. Given the right logic, we can 
piece together what a host is and how it is interacting 
with the network. This enables us to remove most of the 
human data entry from the host inventory. It also allows 
for more timely updates to the inventory and is therefore 
more accurate at any point in time. This will help solve 
the problem, identified in question 4.13 of the survey, 
that most institutions spend at least a moderate amount 
of time updating host records. It will also reduce the 
time necessary to identify physical locations of hosts 
Figure 13: Diagram of a data-driven host inventory system 
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that is shown in Figure 7 and 8. Lastly, this approach 
should improve confidence in the ability to track more 
host types. 
The authors are also taking into consideration that 
any current inventory system needs to accommodate a 
hundred-thousand hosts or more in a given day with 
many moving around the network. This can be 
accomplished using modern, scalable technologies such 
as clustered message queues, flexible parsing engines, 
and distributed data stores.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
More work needs to be done to address the needs of 
host inventory in higher education, and specifically, 
research institution networks. The Critical Security 
Control One provides a high-level goal that every 
network should strive to achieve. However, the 
recommended technologies for implementing the 
control can be difficult for some institutions.  
Therefore, a data-driven host inventory system is 
needed to address the dynamic nature and growth of 
connected end-user devices. In addition, new classes of 
hosts, such as IoT, virtual machines, and application 
containers, are contributing to decreased effectiveness 
in higher education institutions’ abilities to track 
locations and responsible users. Using real-time log 
analytics, a data-driven host inventory system can help 
reverse this trend.  
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